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We study voting rules for participatory budgeting, where a group of voters collec-
tively decides which projects should be funded using a common budget. We allow the
projects to have arbitrary costs, and the voters to have arbitrary additive valuations
over the projects. We formulate two axioms that guarantee proportional represen-
tation to groups of voters with common interests. To the best of our knowledge,
all known rules for participatory budgeting do not satisfy either of the two axioms;
in addition we show that the most prominent proportional rules for committee elec-
tions (such as Proportional Approval Voting) cannot be adapted to arbitrary costs
nor to additive valuations so that they would satisfy our axioms of proportionality.
We construct a simple and attractive voting rule that satisfies one of our axioms (for
arbitrary costs and arbitrary additive valuations), and that can be evaluated in poly-
nomial time. We prove that our other stronger axiom is also satisfiable, though by a
computationally more expensive and less natural voting rule.
1 Introduction
A growing list of cities now uses Participatory Budgeting (PB) to decide how to spend their bud-
gets [Cabannes, 2004, Aziz and Shah, 2020]. Through a voting system, PB allows the residents of
a city to decide which projects will be funded by the government. This increases civic involvement
in government, by increasing the number of issues that are decided by democratic vote, and by
allowing residents to submit their own project proposals.
To count the votes, most cities use a variant of a simple protocol: Each voter is allowed to
vote for a certain number of project proposals. Then, the projects with the highest number of
votes are funded, until the budget limit is reached. While simple and intuitive, this is a bad
voting rule. To see this, consider Circleville, a fictional city divided into four districts. A map of
the city is shown in Figure 1. The districts all have similar sizes, but Northside has the largest
population. Suppose $400k have been allocated to PB, and suppose that all the project proposals
are of a local character (such as school renovations), so we can assume that residents only vote for
projects that concern their own district. For example, every Northside resident will cast votes for
projects A, B, C, and D, but no one else votes for these. Because Northside is the most populous
district, the Northside projects will all receive the highest number of votes, and the voting rule
described will spend the entire budget on Northside projects. The 280k residents of the other
three districts are left empty-handed.
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Figure 1: Map of Circleville, showing the locations and costs of the PB project proposals.
To circumvent this obvious issue, many cities have opted to hold separate elections for each
district. The budget is divided in advance between the districts (e.g., in proportion to their
number of residents), each project is assigned to a district, and voters only vote in their local
election. While this avoids the issue of spending the entire budget in Northside, this fix introduces
many other problems. For example, projects on the boundary of two districts (such as A and P )
need to be assigned to one of them. Residents of the other district may be in favor of the boundary
project, but cannot vote for it. Thus boundary projects are less likely to be funded, even if they
would be more valuable overall. Similarly, projects without a specific location that benefit the
entire city cannot be handled. Also, interest groups that are not geographic in nature will be
underserved; for instance, parents across the city might favor construction of a large playground
(project C), but with separate district elections, parents cannot form a voting block. Similarly,
bike riders across the city cannot express their joint interest in the construction of a bike trail
along Example River (projects R, S, H, and G).
To solve these problems, it seems desirable to hold a single city-wide election, but use a voting
system that ensures that money is spent proportionally. The voting system should automatically
and endogenously identify groups of voters who share common interests, and make sure that
those groups are appropriately represented. This aim has been identified by several researchers
[Aziz et al., 2018b], but no convincing proposal for a proportional voting rule has emerged so far.
Indeed, no good formalization of proportionality for the PB context has been identified in the
literature, except for the concept of the core. However, the core is a very demanding requirement,
and there are situations where it fails to exist [Fain et al., 2018].
In this paper, we formalize proportionality for participatory budgeting as an axiom called
extended justified representation (EJR). The axiom requires that no group of voters with common
interests is underserved. We construct a simple and attractive voting rule that satisfies EJR. We
then discuss a potential strengthening of EJR, and show that this strengthening is still satisfiable,
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albeit by a different voting rule. We hope that our axioms and rules will provide a strong starting
point for the further development of the PB literature from a social choice perspective.
Our approach: Generalize concepts from multi-winner voting
Both our proportionality axiom and our voting rule are generalizations of concepts that have been
introduced in the literature on multi-winner voting [Faliszewski et al., 2017]. That literature can
be seen as handling a special case of PB, where all projects cost the same amount of money. This
is often called the unit cost assumption. Under this assumption, the problem is equivalent to
selecting a committee of a specified size k. It turns out that the unit cost assumption substantially
simplified the conceptual difficulties involved.
Much of the relevant literature studies rules that work with approval ballots, where voters are
allowed to approve or disapprove each project. In the main part of the paper, we will allow any
additive valuations (not just 0/1), which is more expressive. Indeed, the proportionality axioms
and voting rules that we introduce all work for general additive valuations. This is notable, since
allowing additive valuations introduces significant conceptual difficulty. Most prominent multi-
winner voting rules seem to not naturally extend to additive valuations (or at least not gracefully).
However, to make it easier to compare our results to the literature, let us for now focus just on
approval-based rules.
The study of approval-based multi-winner voting rules has been very productive
[Aziz et al., 2017, Brill et al., 2017, Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017, Lackner and Skowron, 2018,
Peters and Skowron, 2020]. Researchers have identified a considerable number of proportionality
axioms and of attractive voting rules for this case. We will begin our discussion by explaining
why most of these results break down if we do not use the unit cost assumption.
Proportional Approval Voting is not proportional, nor is any variant of it
Probably the most popular multi-winner voting rule is Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), also
known as Thiele’s method after its Swedish first inventor Thiele [1895]. Thiele’s rule is based on
optimization. Suppose that N is the set of voters, and that each voter i ∈ N has indicated a set
A(i) of projects that i approves. Then for each set W of projects which is feasible (i.e. its total
cost is at most the budget limit), the rule computes the score
PAV-score(W ) =
∑
i∈N
(
1 +
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+
1
|W ∩A(i)|
)
.
The output of PAV is a feasible set W that maximizes this score. When the unit cost assumption
holds, PAV is a great rule and lives up to its name: it is known to be proportional both in
an axiomatic sense [Aziz et al., 2017] and in a quantitative sense [Skowron, 2018]. In fact, it
is known that among optimization-based rules, only PAV is proportional [Lackner and Skowron,
2018, Aziz et al., 2017].
However, when the unit cost assumption does not hold, PAV ceases to guarantee proportional
representation. To see this, consider the city of Onetown shown in Figure 2. Onetown has 90,000
residents split in two districts, and has $90,000 available for participatory budgeting. The 60,000
residents in Leftside all vote for projects {L1, L2, L3} and the 30,000 residents in Rightside vote
for the single project {R}. Note that the prices are such that we can either afford to implement all
three L-projects giving PAV score 110,000, or implement two L-projects and the R-project giving
PAV score 120,000. Thus, PAV implements project R and only two L-projects. However, note
that Leftside residents form two thirds of the population of Onetown, and so by proportionality are
entitled to two thirds of the budget ($60,000), which is enough to implement all three L-projects.
Hence, Leftside is underrepresented by PAV.
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Figure 2: Onetown and Twotown are identical, except that the projects have different costs. Both
have a budget of $90k available for PB.
To see what is going on, consider Twotown from Figure 2. Twotown is just like Onetown,
except that now each projects cost $30,000. Note that for Twotown it is still the case that we can
either afford all three L-projects, or two L-projects plus R. By the same calculation as before,
PAV implements the latter possibility. This time, this is the proportional choice: Leftside now
deserves only two projects, since only two projects are affordable with Leftside’s share of the
budget.
Onetown and Twotown are nearly identical: same number of residents, same district structure,
same alternatives, same approval sets, and even the feasibility constraint (three L or two L plus
R) is the same. Since the definition of PAV only depends on these characteristics, it must select
the same outcome for both towns. But the prices differ, and therefore different outcomes are
proportional, and hence PAV fails proportionality. The same is true for all other rules that
depend only on preferences and feasibility constraints but not prices. This suggests that there is
no variant of PAV that retains its proportionality guarantees beyond the unit cost case.
Theorem 1. Every voting rule that only depends on voters’ utility functions and the collection
of budget-feasible sets must fail proportionality, even on instances with a district structure.
Phragme´n’s rule is inefficient
Phragme´n [1894, 1895] proposed an alternative to Thiele’s method. Phragme´n’s rule also satisfies
proportionality axioms in the unit cost case [Janson, 2016, Brill et al., 2017, Peters and Skowron,
2020], and it can be naturally extended for cases without unit costs [Aziz et al., 2018b]. The
rule is easiest to explain via a continuous process. Each voter is assigned a virtual bank account,
which starts out empty. We continuously top up each voter’s account at a constant rate, say
$1 per hour. We continue doing this until the first moment where there exists a project whose
supporters own enough money to finance that project. We then implement that project and reset
the bank accounts of the supporters to 0. (If several projects become affordable simultaneously,
we break the tie arbitrarily.) We continue this process until we reach a project which, when
implemented, would overshoot the budget limit, and stop.
In Onetown, under Phragme´n’s rule, the residents of Leftside would collectively own $20k after
20 minutes (1/3 hour), when we implement say L1. At 40 minutes we implement L2, and at 60
minutes we implement L3. A total of 1 hour has passed; the residents of Rightside own $30k
at this point, which is not enough to implement R. Hence, Phragme´n implements all three L-
projects in Onetown. In Twotown, we implement L1 at 30 minutes, L2 at 60 minutes, and also
R at 60 minutes; then we have run out of budget. Thus, Phragme´n implements two L-projects
and R in Twotown.
Note that in both cases, Phragme´n’s rule identified the outcome that was required by propor-
tionality (in contrast to PAV). In general, it is easy to see that Phragme´n’s rule always selects a
proportional outcome on instances with a district structure like in Onetown and Twotown.
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However, Phragme´n’s rule is a greedy rule and can make inefficient choices. Suppose there are
two projects: B costs $200, and C costs $1. The overall budget is $200, and there are 100 voters.
All voters approve B, and exactly one voter called i′ additionally approves C. After 1 hour, i′ has
received $1 and implements C. After 2 hours, the entire budget of $200 has been disbursed to
the voters, but only $199 is left, so Phragme´n’s rule cannot buy B. Thus, only C is implemented
and $199 goes to waste. We could have instead implemented B but not C and thereby obtained
a large Pareto improvement.
The source of this failure of Phragme´n’s method is that it satisfies outcome monotonicity
[Talmon and Faliszewski, 2019], a property known as committee monotonicity or house mono-
tonicity in other contexts. A rule is outcome monotonic if an increase in the budget limit never
causes a previously funded project to get replaced. The 100-voter example above shows that
every outcome monotonic rule that makes use of the entire budget must be severely inefficient.
Rule X: A simple method that guarantees proportionality
We have seen that neither Thiele’s nor Phragme´n’s method works well in settings with non-unit
costs. Some of us [Peters and Skowron, 2020] recently proposed another committee voting rule
that we called Rule X. It turns out that this rule can be naturally extended beyond unit costs,
and that the resulting rule does not suffer from the defects mentioned above.
While Phragme´n’s rule continuously refills voters’ bank accounts, Rule X starts out by dividing
the available budget into equal parts, and giving each voter their share up front. On a high level,
Rule X then repeatedly looks for a project whose approvers have enough money left to fund it; it
does so until no further projects are affordable. Notice that any rule of this type is proportional
on instances with a district structure. But to ensure good behavior on other instance it is crucial
exactly how the rule chooses among different affordable projects and how the rule divides the
chosen project’s cost among its supporters. Rule X always spreads the cost of the project as
evenly as possible, which means that all supporters contribute the same amount of money to it;
if some supporters do not have this amount of money left, they spend their entire remaining
budget. If several projects are affordable, Rule X chooses the project that minimzes the highest
amount that any supporter needs to pay. (Thus, all else equal, Rule X favors cheap projects over
expensive ones, and favors projects with many supporters over projects with fewer.)
As we mentioned, it is clear that Rule X is proportional on district-based instances. On its
own, this is a rather weak guarantee. In the real world, like in Circleville (Figure 1), voters will
sometimes vote for projects in other districts, and it is uncommon that voters will approve all
the projects in their own district. A truly proportional voting rule should be able to represent all
kinds of interest groups, even in cases where the same voter is part of several such groups.
Consider an arbitrary subset of voters, S ⊆ N . For example, S could be the residents of a
district, or the set of parents in Circleville, or the set of bike users. The group S forms a fraction
|S|/|N | of the population, and thus intuitively its members deserve to control a fraction |S|/|N |
of the budget. This idea is the basis of most proportionality axioms developed in the literature;
they differ by how they formalize the notion of “deserving” part of the budget. We will consider
an axiom that guarantees to represent groups whenver they are sufficiently cohesive, in the sense
of having similar preferences. Suppose that S can come up with a set T of projects such that
T can be funded with a |S|/|N | fraction of the budget. Suppose further that each voter in S
approves all the projects in T ; this means the group is cohesive. Then an axiom called Extended
Justified Representation (EJR) demands that the voting rule select a set W such that at least
one voter in S approves at least |T | of the funded projects in W . In other words, EJR prohibits
sets W where all the voters in S are underrepresented in the sense that they would all prefer the
5
set T to W .1
EJR was first proposed in the context of committee voting by Aziz et al. [2017]. EJR is a de-
manding property, and for a time, PAV was the only known natural voting rule satisfying it, but
we have seen that without unit costs, PAV fails EJR even in well-structured cases. Phragme´n’s
rule is known to fail EJR even for unit costs [Brill et al., 2017]. However, Peters and Skowron
[2020] showed that Rule X satisfies EJR, and this continues to hold without the unit cost assump-
tion.
Theorem. Rule X satisfies Extended Justified Representation.
The intuition behind this result is that, under Rule X, a group S is explicitly given their share
of the budget. As the rule progresses, the money of S is spent and by design of Rule X it is
spent on projects that provide good value for money. Thus, the only way that S could end up
underrepresented is if Rule X does not spend all of S’s money; but we can show that this never
happens if S is cohesive.
FJR: A proportionality axiom even stronger than EJR
In approval-based multiwinner elections, it is fair to say that EJR is the strongest pro-
portionality axiom that is known to always be satisfiable.2 Many other rules such as
Phragme´n’s rule or Chamberlin–Courant only satisfy substantially weaker axioms (known as
PJR [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] and JR [Aziz et al., 2017]).
A very attractive strengthening of EJR is the core [Aziz et al., 2017, Fain et al., 2018]. We say
that a set S ⊆ N of voters blocks an outcome W if there is a set T of projects affordable with a
|S|/|N | fraction of the budget such that each member of S strictly prefers T to W (in the sense
that each member of S approves strictly more projects in T than in W ). In such a case, the
group S appears to be underrepresented. An outcome W is in the core if it is not blocked by any
coalition S. It is unknown whether there always exists an outcome in the core (even under the
unit cost assumption), and this is surely the most tantalizing open problem in this area.
Note that the core implies EJR, since EJR requires that W is not blocked by a set T that is
unanimous for S (i.e. all projects in T are approved by all members of S). We propose a property
that is in between these two properties, by partially relaxing the cohesiveness requirement. We
call this axiom Fully Justified Representation (FJR).3 FJR requires that if a group S ⊆ N of
voters can propose a set T of projects that is affordable with S’s share of the budget, and each
voter approves at least ℓ projects in T , then at least one voter in S must approve at least ℓ
projects in the chosen outcome W . Thus, rather than insisting that T is unanimously approved
by the group S (like in EJR), we are now also considering cases where T is very popular among
S though not necessarily unanimous.
To the best of our knowledge, this natural axiom was not known to be satisfiable even for unit
costs; in particular, both PAV and Rule X fail FJR (Examples 4 and 5). We prove that there does
indeed exist a rule satisfying FJR, which works for arbitrary costs. The rule is a simple greedy
procedure that repeatedly looks for groups with maximum cohesiveness and then satisfies them.
1When formulated for unit costs, EJR can be applied recursively and thereby gains additional strength, since it
implies that the number of well-represented voters in S is high [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017]: EJR requires
that in S there exists a voter, say i, who is well-represented; if we remove this voter then the group S \ {i} is
still cohesive, and EJR would require that in this group there also exists a voter who is well-represented, etc.
2Though the literature contains other proportionality notions that are both logically and conceptually incompa-
rable, such as “perfect representation” [Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] satisfied by the Monroe rule, and the
concepts of laminar proportionality and priceability [Peters and Skowron, 2020] satisfied by Phragme´n’s rule
and Rule X.
3Apologies that this name is not particularly descriptive, but then neither is EJR or PJR.
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While this is not a polynomial-time algorithm and not a particularly natural rule, we can show
that this proposal can be made compatible with some other properties (in particular priceability,
a property introduced by [Peters and Skowron, 2020]). For future work, it will be interesting to
look for new natural rules satisfying FJR; this is even interesting for the committee context.
Beyond approval: Allowing more expressive preferences
In real-world PB elections, different projects differ vastly in their costs. For example, in the 2019
PB election in the 16th arrondissement of Paris, the most expensive project that was funded
cost e 560k (refurbishing a sports facility) and the cheapest cost e 3k (providing materials for a
school project of building a board game). The former project received 775 votes, and the latter
670 votes. Hence, the former project was 1.15 times as popular as the latter, but it cost 186 times
as much! If we take the votes at face value, counting all approvals the same, it would seem that
the cheap project provides an amazing value. It is more likely, though, that the approval-based
interface did not allow voters to adequately express their values.
Facing these large cost differences, a better preference model might be given by general additive
valuations, which allow voters to specify an arbitrary utility value for each project, with the
assumption that a voter’s satisfaction is proportional to the sum of the utilities of the funded
projects. In the PB context, this model is considered by Benade et al. [2017] who study preference
elicitation issues, and by Fain et al. [2018] and Fluschnik et al. [2019] who consider an aggregation
rule similar to PAV, based on optimizing a Nash product objective. The latter rule will not satisfy
us, given our discussion of Onetown and Twotown above. Further, even for unit costs, the rule
does not satisfy our version of the EJR axiom.
We propose a way to adapt Rule X to general additive valuations. In our proposal, when Rule X
decides to fund a project, a voter’s payment is proportional to the voter’s utility for the project.
So if voter i assigns utility 2 to project B while j assigns utility 1 to B, then Rule X will ask i to
pay twice as much as j if B is funded. We also propose a natural way to extend the EJR axiom
to general additive valuations. Rule X satisfies it. FJR can also be extended to general utilities,
and our greedy rule satisfying this property continues to work for general additive utilities. (Our
version of EJR for general additive utilities contains an “up to one” approximation element, which
may not be necessary. The general version of FJR does not.)
We close by discussing another input format, where voters have ordinal preferences, that is,
where voters rank the projects in order of preferences. We show that if we convert rankings into
additive valuations using a lexicographic scheme, then our two voting rules give rise to voting rules
for the ordinal setting. In particular, Rule X satisfies a property known as Proportionality for
Solid Coalitions, a property first defined for the Single Transferable Vote (STV), a multi-winner
voting rule used in many political constituencies in the anglosphere. GCR fails this property.
2 Preliminaries
For each t ∈ N, write [t] = {1, 2, . . . , t}. An election is a tuple (N,C, cost, {ui}i∈N ), where:
• N = [n] and C = {c1, . . . , cm} (n,m ∈ N) are the sets of voters and candidates (or projects),
respectively.
• cost : C → Q+ is a function that for each candidate c ∈ C assigns the cost that needs to be
paid if c is selected. For each subset T ⊆ C, we write cost(T ) =
∑
c∈T cost(c) for the total
cost of the projects in T .
• For each voter i ∈ N , the function ui : C → [0, 1] defines i’s additive utility function. If
a set T ⊆ C of candidates is implemented, i’s overall utility is ui(T ) =
∑
c∈T ui(c). For
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a subset S ⊆ N of voters, we further write uS(T ) =
∑
i∈S
∑
c∈T ui(c) for the total utility
enjoyed by S if T is implemented. We assume that uN (c) > 0 for each c ∈ C, that is, every
candidate is assigned positive utility by at least one voter.
The voters have a fixed common budget which we normalize to 1. A subset of candidates
W ⊆ C is feasible if cost(W ) 6 1. Our goal is to choose a feasible subset of candidates, which we
call an outcome, based on voters’ utilities. An aggregation rule (or, in short, a rule) is a function
that for each election returns a set of feasible outcomes, called the winning outcomes.4
There are two interesting special cases of our model:
Committee elections. In this case, there exists k ∈ N such that each candidate costs 1/k. Then
W is an outcome if and only if |W | 6 k. In this special case we also refer to outcomes as
committees, and we say that the election satisfies the unit cost assumption. For committee
elections we will often refer to k as the maximal committee size.
Approval-based elections. In this case, for each i ∈ N and c ∈ C it holds that ui(c) ∈ {0, 1}.
The approval set of voter i is A(i) := {c ∈ C : ui(c) = 1}, and we say that i approves
candidate c if c ∈ A(i). If c ∈ A(i) ∩W , we say that c is a representative of i.
Often we combine of these special cases, and study approval-based committee elections.
3 Rule X
Recently, Peters and Skowron [2020] introduced an aggregation rule called Rule X for approval-
based committee elections. In that setting, they showed that Rule X satisfies a combination of
appealing proportionality properties. Here, we extend it to the more general model of participa-
tory budgeting, that is, to the model with arbitrary costs and utilities.
Definition 1 (Rule X). Each voter is initially given an equal fraction of the budget, i.e., each
voter is given 1/n dollars. We start with an empty outcomeW = ∅ and sequentially add candidates
toW . To add a candidate c toW , we need the voters to pay for c. Write pi(c) for the amount that
voter i pays for c; we will need that
∑
i∈N pi(c) = cost(c). We write pi(W ) =
∑
c∈W pi(c) 6
1
n
for
the total amount i has paid so far. For ρ > 0, we say that a candidate c 6∈W is ρ-affordable if∑
i∈N
min
(
1
n
− pi(W ), ui(c) · ρ
)
= cost(c).
If no candidate is ρ-affordable for any ρ, Rule X terminates and returns W . Otherwise it selects
a candidate c 6∈W that is ρ-affordable for a minimum ρ. Individual payments are given by
pi(c) = min
(
1
n
− pi(W ), ui(c) · ρ
)
Intuitively, when Rule X adds a candidate c, it asks voters to pay an amount proportional
to their utility ui(c) for c; in particular, the cost per unit of utility is ρ. If a voter does not
have enough money, the rule asks the voter to pay all the money the voter has left, which is
1
n
− pi(W ). Throughout the execution of Rule X, the value ρ increases. Thus, candidates are
added in decreasing order of utility per dollar that the voters get from the candidates.
4Typically, a rule will be selecting a single winning outcome, but ties are possible. For the results of this paper it
won’t matter how these ties are broken.
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3.1 Extended Justified Representation (EJR)
The first notion of proportionality that we examine is Extended Justified Representation (EJR).
This axiom was first proposed for approval-based committee elections [Aziz et al., 2017]. Even
for the special case of approval-based committee elections, only few rules are known to satisfy
EJR [Aziz et al., 2017, 2018a, Peters and Skowron, 2020], but Rule X is one of them. In this
section, we introduce a generalization of EJR to the PB model and show that our generalization
of Rule X continues to satisfy EJR.
We first recall the definition of EJR for approval-based committee elections. Intuitively, this
axiom ensures that every large enough group of voters whose approval sets have a large enough
intersection must obtain a fair number of representatives.
Definition 2 (Extended Justified Representation for approval-based committee elections). We
say that a group of voters S is ℓ-cohesive for ℓ ∈ N if |S| > ℓ/k · n and |
⋂
i∈S A(i)| > ℓ.
A rule R satisfies extended justified representation if for each election instance E and each
ℓ-cohesive group S of voters there exists a voter i ∈ S such that |A(i) ∩R(E)| > ℓ.
At first sight it is unintuitive that we only require that at least one voter obtain ℓ representatives.
However, the strengthening of EJR that requires each member of S to obtain ℓ representatives is
impossible even on very small instances [Aziz et al., 2017]. However, even with only the at-least-
one guarantee, EJR has plenty of bite [Aziz et al., 2018a, Skowron, 2018, Peters and Skowron,
2020].
The generalization of this axiom to the PB model is not straightforward and to the best of our
knowledge none has been proposed in the literature.5 To warm up, let’s first relax the unit cost
assumption, but stay in the approval-based setting. Then, it seems to us, EJR should state the
following.
Definition 3 (Extended Justified Representation for approval-based elections). We say that a
group of voters S is T -cohesive for T ⊆ C if |S| > cost(T ) · n and T ⊆
⋂
i∈S A(i).
A rule R satisfies extended justified representation if for each election instance E and each
T -cohesive group S of voters there exists a voter i ∈ S such that |A(i) ∩R(E)| > |T |.
Thus, cohesiveness now requires that the group S can identify a collection of projects T that
they all approve and that is affordable with their fraction of the budget (|S| > cost(T ) · n). Note
that voters i ∈ S obtain utility ui(T ) = |T | from T ; EJR requires that at least one member of S
must attain this utility in the election outcome.
To further generalize EJR beyond approvals is more difficult, because the notion of a candidate
who is approved by all members of S does not have an analogue. Instead, we quantify cohesion
by calculating the minimum utility that any member of S assigns to each project in T .
Definition 4 (Extended Justified Representation). We say that a group of voters S is (α, T )-
cohesive for α : C −→ [0; 1] and T ⊆ C, if |S| > cost(T ) · n and if it holds that ui(c) > α(c) for
every voter i ∈ S and each candidate c ∈ T .
A rule R satisfies extended justified representation (up to one project) if for each election
instance E and each (α, T )-cohesive group of voters S there exists a voter i ∈ S such that either
ui(R(E)) >
∑
c∈T α(c) or for some a ∈ C it holds that ui(R(E) ∪ {a}) >
∑
c∈T α(c).
Again, an (α, T )-cohesive group of voters S can propose the projects in T , since they are
affordable with S’s share of the budget. The values (α(c))c∈T denote how much the coalition S
5Aziz et al. [2018b] generalize the weaker axiom of Proportional Justified Representation (PJR)
[Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017] beyond unit costs, but they operate in a non-standard utility model
where voters care more about more expensive projects.
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agrees about the desirability of the projects in T . In particular, we have ui(T ) >
∑
c∈T α(c) for
each i ∈ S. Consequently, Definition 4 prohibits any outcome in which ever voter in S gets utility
strictly lower than
∑
c∈T α(c); hence there must exists i ∈ S such that ui(R(E)) >
∑
c∈T α(c).
We introduce the alternative condition (which relaxes EJR to hold “up to one project”) to simplify
the reasoning for rules like Rule X that do no always utilitze the whole budget. We will return
to this issue in Section 3.4. In Section 4.1, we consider EJR without this weakening condition.
However, it is worth noting that in the approval-based model, Definitions 3 and 4 are actually
equivalent, because the “up to one project” option never applies: Consider an (α, T )-cohesive
group of voters S. Since voters’ utilities are 0/1, we may assume that for each c ∈ T we have
α(c) = 1: if α(c) > 0 this is clear; otherwise we can remove c from T without losing cohesiveness.
Thus, the cohesiveness condition is equivalent to the condition that every voter approves every
candidate in T . Finally, note that in the approval model, due to the strict inequality, both
conditions ui(R(E)) >
∑
c∈T α(c) and ∃a∈C .ui(R(E) ∪ {a}) >
∑
c∈T α(c) boil down to |A(i) ∩
R(E)| >
∑
c∈T α(c) = |T |, which is the condition from Definition 3.
Our main result is that Rule X satisfies our generalized EJR axiom.
Theorem 2. Rule X satisfies EJR in the participatory budgeting model.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there exists an election E, a subset of voters
S ⊆ N and a set of candidates T ⊆ C such that: (i) cost(T ) 6 |S|/n, (ii) ui(c) > α(c) > 0
(candidates with α(c) = 0 can be skipped) for each i ∈ S and c ∈ T , and (iii) ui(R(E) ∪ {a}) 6∑
c∈T α(c) for each i ∈ S and a ∈ T .
Assume for a while that the voters from S have unrestricted initial budgets, and let us analyze
how Rule X would proceed in such a case. For the sake of simplicity of the presentation, without
loss of generality, let us rename the candidates in T so that T = {c1, . . . , ct} and so that for
1 6 i < j 6 t candidate ci is picked by Rule X before candidate cj .
Whenever a candidate c ∈ T is selected the voters pay for this candidate—the voter i pays
pi(c) dollars for c, and in return, she gets the utility of ui(c). Thus, the price-per-utility she pays
equals ρi(c) = pi(c)/ui(c). Rule X works in a way that all voters from S who pay for c pay for it
using the same price-per-utility, i.e., for all i, j ∈ S and c ∈ C we have that ρi(c) = ρj(c). Further,
this price-per-utility equals at most cost(c)/uS(c), independenly on whether any voters from N \ S
pay for c or not (if no voters from N \ S pays for c, then the price-per-utility equals exactly
cost(c)/uS(c)):
ρi(c) =
pi(c)
ui(c)
=
pi(c) ·
∑
j∈S uj(c)∑
j∈S uj(c)
ui(c)
=
1∑
j∈S uj(c)
·
∑
j∈S
pi(c)
ui(c)
· uj(c)
=
1∑
j∈S uj(c)
·
∑
j∈S
pj(c) 6
cost(c)
uS(c)
.
(1)
Since ui(c) > α(c) for each i ∈ S and c ∈ T the price-per-utility for c ∈ T equals at most
cost(c)/|S|α(c). Now, consider the voter who, in the first possible iteration uses more than 1/n
dollars6. For this voter, call her i, let us consider the function f defined as follows. For each
value x function f returns the price that i needs to pay to achieve the utility of x. We make this
function continuous, by assuming that the candidates are divisible. That is, if the voter pays p
for her first paid candidate c with utility ui(c), then f(ui(c)/2) = p/2, f(ui(c)/3) = p/3, etc.. The key
observation is that the function f is convex—this is because Rule X selects the candidates in the
increasing order of prices-per-utilities. This function is depicted below.
6The only case when there is no such voter is when every candidate c ∈ C such that uS(c) > 0 has already been
elected before—in such case, the utility of i from the elected outcome is clearly at least
∑
c∈T ui(c) >
∑
c∈T α(c).
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ui(c1)
pi(c1)
ui(c)
c /∈ T
pi(c)
ui(c2)
pi(c2)
∑
c∈T α(c)
t
We are interested in the value f(
∑
c∈T α(c)). This value would be maximized if the fragments
of the function with the lowest slope were the shortest. However, we know that the part of the
function that corresponds ρi(c) must be of length at least equal to ui(c) > α(c). Thus:
f
(∑
c∈T
α(c)
)
6
∑
c∈T
α(c) · ρi(c) 6
∑
c∈T
α(c) ·
cost(c)
|S|α(c)
=
∑
c∈T
cost(c)
|S|
=
cost(T )
|S|
6
1
n
.
Now, consider the first moment when i uses more than 1/n dollars. Until this time moment,
Rule X behaves exactly in the same way as if the voters from S had their initial budgets set to 1/n
(this follows from how we chose i). Further, we know that in this moment, if we chose a candidate
that would be chosen if the voters had unrestricted budgets, then the utility of voter i would be
greater than
∑
c∈T α(c). This gives a contradiction, and completes the proof.
As we established in the introduction (Theorem 1), the most prominent rule that satisfies EJR
for approval-based committee election does not extend this guarantee beyond unit costs. Let us
briefly recall the definition of this rule.
Definition 5 (Proportional Approval Voting (PAV)). Consider an approval-based election. PAV
selects a feasible outcome that maximizes
∑
i∈N H(|A(i) ∩W |), where H(r) is the r-th harmonic
number, i.e., H(r) =
∑r
j=1
1/j.
Onetown, as shown in Figure 2, showed that PAV fails EJR (in the sense of Definition 3).
Example 1 below constructs an alternative instance on which PAV does not satisfy EJR. In fact,
this example shows that PAV does not even approximate EJR up to a constant factor.
Example 1. Fix a constant r ∈ N (r > 2), and consider the following approval-based profile:
r2 − 1 voters: {a1, a2, . . . , ar},
1 voter: {b1, b2, . . . , br}.
The candidates a1, a2, . . . , ar cost 1/r dollars each; the candidates b1, b2, . . . , br cost 1/r3 dollars
each. EJR requires that the one voter who approves candidates b1, . . . , br must approve at least
r candidates in the outcome. However, PAV selects {a1, a2, . . . , ar}, leaving the one voter with
nothing.
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3.2 Approximating the Core
An important proportionality property advocated for PB is the core [Aziz et al., 2017, Fain et al.,
2018]. It strengthens EJR by removing the cohesiveness requirement on groups S of voters.
Definition 6 (The Core). For a given election instance (N,C, cost, {ui}i∈N ), we say that an
outcome W is in the core, if for every S ⊆ N and T ⊆ C with |S| > cost(T ) · n there exists i ∈ S
such that ui(W ) > ui(T ). We say that an election rule R satisfies the core property if for each
election instance E the winning outcome R(E) is in the core.
While this is a clean and appealing notion, unfortunately, there are elections where no outcome
is in the core, even with unit costs.
Example 2. 7 We have 6 voters and 6 candidates with unit costs, and k = 3. Utilities satisfy
u1(c1) > u1(c2) > 0, u2(c2) > u2(c3) > 0, u3(c3) > u3(c1) > 0;
u4(c4) > u4(c5) > 0, u5(c5) > u5(c6) > 0, u6(c6) > u6(c4) > 0,
and all unspecified utilities are equal to 0. Let W ⊆ C be any feasible outcome, so |W | 6 3.
Then either |W ∩ {c1, c2, c3}| 6 1 or |W ∩ {c4, c5, c6}| 6 1. Without loss of generality assume
the former, and again without loss assume that c2 6∈ W and c3 6∈ W . Then S = {v2, v3} and
T = {c3} block W and show it is not in the core, since 2 = |S| > cost(T ) ∗n =
1
3 · 6 = 2 and both
u2(c3) > u2(c1) > u2(W ) and u3(c3) > u3(c1) > u3(W ).
Notably, this example is not approval-based. It is unknown whether the core is always non-
empty for approval-based elections (with or without the unit cost assumption).
In the committee context, Peters and Skowron [2020] showed that Rule X returns an outcome
that never violates the core too badly; formally, Rule X provides a multiplicative approximation
to the core.8 We can generalize this result to the general PB setting: Rule X continues to provide
a good multiplicative approximation to the core property.
Definition 7. For α > 1, we say that an outcome is in the α-core if for every S ⊆ N and T ⊆ C
with
∑
c∈T cost(c) 6 |S|/n there exists i ∈ S and c ∈ T such that ui(R(E) ∪ {c}) >
ui(T )
α
.
Theorem 3. Given an election E, by umax we denote the highest utility a voter can get from a
feasible outcome. Analogously, by umin we denote the smallest, yet still positive utility a voter can
get from a feasible outcome:
umax = max
i∈N
max
cost(W )61
ui(W ) and umin = min
i∈N
min
ui(W )>0
ui(W ).
Rule X satisfies the α-core property for α = 4 log(2 · umax/umin).
Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume there exist an election instance E, a winning outcome
W ∈ R(E), a subset of voters S ⊆ N , and a subset of candidates T ⊆ C with
∑
c∈T cost(c) 6 |S|/n
such that for each i ∈ S and c ∈ T it holds that ui(W ∪ {c}) < ui(T )/α.
Now, consider a fixed subset S′ ⊆ S, and let:
∆(S′) =
∑
i∈S′
(
ui(T )− ui(W )
)
.
7This example is adapted from Fain et al. [2018, Appendix C]. We thank Paul Go¨lz for discussions.
8Our approximation notion is different from the one proposed by Fain et al. [2018] and the one proposed by
Cheng et al. [2019] and Jiang et al. [2020].
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Similarly, as in the proof of Theorem 2, assume for a while that the voters from S′ have
unrestricted initial budgets, and let us analyze how Rule X would proceed in such a case. By the
pigeonhole principle it follows that in each step of the rule there exists a not-elected candidate
c ∈ T \W such that:
uS′(c)
cost(c)
>
∆(S′)
cost(T )
.
Indeed, if for each c ∈ T \W we had
uS′(c)
cost(c) <
∆(S′)
cost(T ) , then:
∆(S′) 6
∑
c∈T\W
uS′(c) <
∑
c∈T\W
cost(c) ·
∆(S′)
cost(T )
6 ∆(S′),
a contradiction.
Thus, the price-per-utility that the voters pay for the selected candidates equals at most cost(T )∆(S′) .
(This follows from the fact that Rule X selects candidates in such an order that the maximal price-
per-utility the voters pay in a given round is minimized. The precise arguments are the same
as in the proof of Theorem 2.) Now, consider the first moment when some voter in S′—call it
i—uses more than its initial budget 1/n. Until this time moment, Rule X bahaves exactly in the
same way as if the voters from S′ had their initial budgets set to 1/n. Further, we know that in
this moment, if we chose a candidate c ∈ T that would be chosen if the voters had unrestricted
budgets, then the voter i would pay more than 1/n in total, and thus, would get the utility of
more than 1
n
· ∆(S
′)
cost(T ) . Since we assumed ui(W ∪ {c}) <
ui(T )/α, we get that:
ui(T )
α
> ui(W ) + ui(c) >
1
n
·
∆(S′)
cost(T )
.
Since α > 2, and so ui(T )− ui(W ) > ui(T )/2, we get that:
ui(T )− ui(W ) >
ui(T )
2
>
α∆(S′)
2n · cost(T )
.
Let S′′ = S′ \ {i}. Clearly, we have that:
∆(S′′) = ∆(S′)− (ui(T )− ui(W )) 6 ∆(S
′)
(
1−
α
2n · cost(T )
)
.
The above reasoning holds for each S′ ⊆ S. Thus, we start with S′ = S and apply it recursively,
in each iteration decreasing the size of S′ by 1. After |S|/2 iterations we are left with a subset Se
such that:
∆(Se) 6 ∆(S)
(
1−
α
2n · cost(T )
) |S|
2
6 ∆(S)
(
1−
α
2n · cost(T )
) cost(T )n
2
< ∆(S)
(
1
e
)α
4
.
Now, observe that ∆(Se) > |S|/2 · umin (for each i ∈ S it must hold that ui(T )− ui(W ) > 0) and
that ∆(S) 6 |S| · umax. Thus, we get that:
|S|
2
umin · e
α
4 < |S| · umax,
which is equivalent to e
α
4 < 2 · umax
umin
and, further, to α < 4 log(2 · umax/umin). This gives a
contradiction and completes the proof.
The bound of α = 4 log(2 · umax/umin) is asymptotically tight, and the hard instance can be
constructed even for the approval-based committee-election model (there, umax/umin 6 k). The
precise construction is given by Peters and Skowron [2020]).
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3.3 Priceability of Rule X
Peters and Skowron [2020] introduced a concept called priceability, which imposes a certain kind
of balance on a voting rule. Every rule that, like Rule X, equally splits the budget between
voters and then sequentially purchases projects using the money of its supporters will be price-
able. Priceability does not place any restrictions on how the rule splits the project’s cost among
supporters. The concept also allows initial budgets higher than 1; an outcome is priceable if there
exists some budget limit for which it is priceable.
Definition 8 (Priceability). A price system is a pair ps = (b, {pi}i∈N ), where b > 1 is the initial
budget (where each voter controls equal part of the budget, namely b/n), and for each voter i ∈ N ,
pi : C → R is a payment function that specifies the amount of money a particular voter pays for
the elected candidates.9,10 An outcome W is supported by a price system ps = (b, {pi}i∈N ) if the
following conditions hold:
(C1). ui(c) = 0 =⇒ pi(c) = 0 for each i ∈ N and c ∈ C,
11
(C2). Each voter has the same initial budget of b/n dollars:
∑
c∈C pi(c) 6 b/n for each i ∈ N .
(C3). Each elected candidate is fully paid:
∑
i∈N pi(c) = cost(c) for each c ∈W .
(C4). The voters do not pay for non-elected candidates:
∑
i∈N pi(c) = 0 for each c /∈W .
(C5). For each unelected candidate c 6∈ W , the unspent budget of her supporters is at
most cost(c):
∑
i∈N :ui(c)>0
(
p−
∑
c′∈W pi(c
′)
)
6 cost(c) for each c /∈W .
An outcome W is said to be priceable if there exists a price system ps = (b, {pi}i∈N ) that
supports W (that satisfies conditions (C1)–(C5)).
It is known that Rule X is priceable in the approval-based committee-election model and in
the general PB model this property is also preserved—indeed, the rule implicitly constructs the
price system satisfying the above conditions.
3.4 Exhaustiveness
A basic and very desirable efficiency notion is exhaustiveness, which requires that a voting rule
spends its entire budget. Of course, due to the discrete model, we cannot guarantee that the rule
will spend exactly 1 dollar (i.e., the entire budget); however, we can require that no additional
project is affordable.
Definition 9 (Exhaustiveness, Aziz et al., 2018b). An election rule R is exhaustive if for each
election instance E and each non-selected candidate c /∈ R(E) it holds that cost(R(E)∪{c}) > 1.
9Originally, Peters and Skowron [2020] assumed that each voter is initially given one dollar, which corresponds
to setting b = n, but that there is an additional variable that specifies the total price that needs to be paid for
an elected candidate. These two formulations are equivalent, but we chose to use the one with fixed prices and
adjustable voters’ initial budgets, since this formulation alows us to reason about our rules more directly.
10The requirement that b > 1 ensures that the voters have at least enough money to buy candidates with the total
cost of 1 (that is, the value of the real budget). Without this requirement, e.g., an empty outcome W = ∅
would be priceable (with b = 0).
11While condition (C1) is well-justified in the approval-based setting, in the general PB model it will have a
significantly limited scope of impact. Indeed, the condition does not put any restrictions on the payments when
the utilities ui(c) are very small, yet still positive.
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Notably, Rule X fails to be exhaustive. It can happen that at the end of Rule X’s execution,
some project remains affordable, but the project’s supporters do not have enough money to pay
for it – Rule X then refuses to fund the project. For example, if we have two voters and two
candidates, such that v1 approves {c1} and v2 approves {c2}. Suppose that both candidates cost
1 dollar. Then Rule X returns W = ∅. In fact, it turns out that exhaustiveness is incompatible
with priceability.
Example 3. We have 3 candidates and 3 voters. The first 2 voters approve {c1}, and the third
one approves {c2, c3}. We have cost(c1) = 1 and cost(c2) = cost(c3) = 1/3. The only exhaustive
outcomes are {c1} and {c2, c3}. However, neither of them is priceable—indeed, to buy both c2
and c3, the third voter needs to control at least 2/3 dollars. Then the first two voters control 4/3
dollars and can buy candidate c1, a contradiction. On the other hand, to buy c1, the first two
voters need to control at least 1 dollar. Then, the third voter controls at least 1/2 dollars and
buys c2 or c3, a contradiction.
In some contexts, the choice of Rule X not to be exhaustive may be desirable, especially
if unspent budget can be used in other productive ways (such as in next year’s PB election).
Arguably, in non-exhaustive examples, no remaining project has sufficient support to justify its
expense; on that view, no further projects should be funded. In other situations, unspent budget
may not be reusable, such as when the budget comes from a grant where unspent money needs
to be returned (and the relevant decision makers do not obtain value from the grant-maker’s
alternative activities), or when the ‘budget’ is time (for example, when we use PB to plan activities
for a day-long company retreat). In such situation, one might prefer an exhaustive rule.
Peters and Skowron [2020] proposed to complete the outcome elected by Rule X with the use
of Phragme´n’s sequential rule (with initial budgets of the voters equal to the final ones after
proceeding Rule X algorithm), a rule that we discussed in our introduction. However, there is no
obvious way of generalizing Phragme´n’s rule to non-approval utilities.12 Moreover, as we saw in
the introduction, an outcome monotonic rule like Phragme´n’s rule is much less appealing without
unit costs.
Since we have generalized Rule X to work for general additive valuations, there is another
way for us to make it exhaustive. Recall that Rule X fails to be exhaustive in situations where
the remaining projects’ supporters do not have sufficient funds left. However, in elections where
ui(c) > 0 for all i ∈ N and C ∈ C, every voter supports every candidate, and thus this problem
never occurs. In fact, Rule X is exhaustive when run on profiles of this type.
Proposition 1. Consider an election E = (N,C, cost, {ui}i∈N ) such that ui(c) > 0 for each
i ∈ N and c ∈ C. The outcome returned by Rule X for E is exhaustive.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction assume that an outcomeW returned by Rule X for an election
instance E is not exhaustive. Then, there exists a candidate c /∈W such that cost(W ∪ {c}) 6 1.
The voters paid in total cost(W ) dollars forW ; their initial budget was 1, thus after W is selected
they all have at least cost(c) unspent money. However, this means that at the end of the execution
of Rule X there exists a possibly very large value of ρ such that:∑
i∈N
min
(
1
n
− pi(W ), ui(c)ρ
)
=
∑
i∈N
(
1
n
− pi(W )
)
> cost(c).
Consequently, c (or some other candidate) would be selected by Rule X, a contradiction.
12One possibility, similar to our generalization of Rule X, would be to require that voters’ payment for selected
projects must be proportional to their utilities. Interestingly, this idea seems to not work at all for Phragme´n’s
rule. For example, consider a committee election with two projects, c1 and c2, committee size k = 1, and two
voters: The first voter assigns utility 1 to c1 and utility 100 to c2; the second voter assigns utility 1 to c1 and 99
to c2. When forced to use proportional payments, Phragme´n’s rule would choose c1, a very inefficient choice.
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Thus, we can make Rule X exhaustive by perturbing the input utilities so that all utility values
are positive. Specifically, for a small ε > 0 (ε≪ minui(c)>0 ui(c)), and for each i ∈ N, c ∈ C such
that ui(c) = 0 in the initial instance we set u
ε
i (c) = ε. Next, we run Rule X on the modified
instance {uεi}i∈N ; by Proposition 1 the outcome is exhaustive. Finally we return the outcome
identified by Rule X as ε→ 0; the result is well-defined by the following result.
Proposition 2. Consider any election E = (N,C, cost, {ui}i∈N ). There exists some ε > 0 such
that for all 0 < ε1, ε2 < ε, Rule X returns the same outcome when run on {u
ε1
i }i∈N and {u
ε2
i }i∈N .
This process gives rise to a different voting rule, an exhaustive variant of Rule X. Note that
this rule is not priceable since it may ask voters to pay for candidates that they assign utility
0. By necessity, this rule sometimes elects candidates that cannot be afforded by its supporters.
In these cases, when we elect such a candidate c, we will ask all supporters of c to pay all their
remaining money for c, and split the remaining cost to be paid equally among voters who do not
support c. Say that the maximum amount paid by a non-supporter for c is x; Rule X selects
those candidate that minimize the value x at each step. Because voters are asked to spend their
entire remaining budget if a non-affordable candidate they like is elected, this extension of Rule
X will not distort the outcome too much.
4 Greedy Cohesive Rule
In Section 3 we discussed the EJR axiom for the PB model, and saw that it is implemented by
Rule X. One may wonder if there is natural strengthening of EJR that is still satisfiable. In
this section we propose such a strengthening, and show that there is a rule that satisfies the
new strong property. Interestingly, even in the approval-based committee-election model our new
property is substantially stronger than EJR, and hence this new rule provides the strongest known
proportionality guarantees. On the other hand, compared to Rule X, it is computationally more
expensive and arguably less natural.
4.1 Full Justified Representation (FJR)
Our new proportionality axiom strengthens EJR by weakening its requirement that groups must
be cohesive. In other words, the new axiom guarantees representation to groups that are only
partially cohesive.
Definition 10 (Full Justified Representation (FJR)). We say that a group of voters S is weakly
(β, T )-cohesive for β ∈ R and T ⊆ C, if |S| > cost(T ) · n and ui(T ) > β for every voter i ∈ S.
A rule R satisfies full justified representation (FJR) if for each election instance E and each
weakly (β, T )-cohesive group of voters S there exists a voter i ∈ S such that ui(R(E)) > β.
In the approval-based committee-election model, FJR boils down to the following requirement:
Let S be a group of voters, and suppose that each member of S approves at least β candidates
from some set T ⊆ C with |T | 6 ℓ, and let |S| > ℓ/k ·n. Then at least one voter from S must have
at least β representatives in the committee. It is clear that in the special case of β = ℓ, we obtain
Definition 2, hence FJR implies EJR. The same implication holds in the general PB model.
Proposition 3. FJR implies EJR in the general PB model.
Proof. Suppose that rule R satisfies FJR and take an (α, T )-cohesive group of voters S for some
α : T −→ [0; 1], T ⊆ C. For every voter i ∈ S and every candidate c ∈ T we have ui(c) > α(c).
We set β =
∑
c∈T α(c); clearly, we have also ui(T ) > β, thus S is weakly cohesive. As R satisfies
FJR, we have that ui(R(E)) > β =
∑
c∈T α(c), which completes the proof.
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In turn, it is easy to see that FJR is implied by the core property (cf. Definition 6). It is related
to, but stronger than, some other relaxations of the core discussed by Peters and Skowron [2020,
Section 5.2]. The two major rules known to satisfy EJR for approval-based committee elections
(Rule X and PAV) both fail FJR; to the best of our knowledge, no known rule satisfies FJR for
approval-based committee elections, let alone for the general PB model.
Example 4 (Rule X). Consider the following instance of approval-based committee elections for
n = 22 voters, m = 13 candidates, and where the goal is to select a committee of size k = 11:
voters 1-3 : {c1, c2, c3, c4, c8} voters 13-15 : {c1, c2, c3, c4, c12}
voters 4-6 : {c1, c2, c3, c4, c9} voters 16-18 : {c5, c6, c7, c8, c9, c10, c11, c12}
voters 7-9 : {c1, c2, c3, c4, c10} voters 19-21 : {c5, c6, c7}
voters 10-12 : {c1, c2, c3, c4, c11} voter 22 : {c13}.
In the first 4 steps, Rule X chooses candidates c1, c2, c3, c4 (this happens for ρ = 1/11·15). After that,
each voter of the first 15 ones has 1/22− 4/11·15 dollars. In next 3 steps, for ρ = 1/11·6, candidates
c5, c6, c7 are chosen: 6 voters who support them spend all their money (1/22 − 3/11·6 = 0). After
that, the algorithm stops. Each of the first 15 voters has 4 candidates she approves; voters 16-18
approve 3 selected candidates. Thus, no member of weakly (5, {c1, c2, c3, c4, c8, c9, c10, c11, c12})-
cohesive group of first 18 voters has 5 representatives.
Example 5 (PAV). This example was first considered by Peters and Skowron [2020, Section 1].
We have m = 15 candidates and n = 6 voters, with the following preferences:
voter 1: {c1, c2, c3, c4} voter 4: {c7, c8, c9}
voter 2: {c1, c2, c3, c5} voter 5: {c10, c11, c12}
voter 3: {c1, c2, c3, c6} voter 6: {c13, c14, c15}.
The size of the committee to be elected is k = 12. PAV chooses in this case
committee {c1, c2, c3, c7, c8, c9, c10, c11, c12, c13, c14, c15}. Hence, no voter from the weakly
(4, {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6})-cohesive group, consisting of the first 3 voters, has 4 representatives.
Since no known aggregation rule satisfies FJR, one might wonder whether FJR existence can
be guaranteed. It turns out that it can: we present a rule satisfying this strong notion of
proportionality.
Definition 11 (Greedy Cohesive Rule (GCR)). The Greedy Cohesive Rule (GCR) is defined
sequentially as follows: we start with an empty outcome W = ∅. At each step, we search for a
value β > 0, a set of voters S ⊆ N , and a set of candidates T ⊆ C such that S is weakly (β, T )-
cohesive. If such values of β, S, and T do not exist, then we stop and return W . Otherwise, we
pick values of β, S, and T that maximize β, breaking ties in favor of smaller cost(T ). We add all
the candidates from T to W , and then remove all voters in S and all candidates in T from the
election and repeat the search.
Let us first check that the Greedy Cohesive Rule always selects a feasible outcome (i.e., that
does not exceed the budget limit). Indeed, whenever the algorithm adds some set T to W , then
by definition of weakly cohesive groups, we have |S| > cost(T ) · n, and hence it removes at least
cost(T ) · n voters after this step. Thus, if GCR selects an outcome with total cost cost(W ), then
it must have removed at least cost(W ) · n voters during its execution. Hence cost(W ) 6 1.
Theorem 4. Greedy Cohesive Rule satisfies FJR.
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Proof. Suppose that there exists a weakly (β, T )-cohesive group S which witnesses that FJR is
not satisfied. Consider the voter i ∈ S who was removed first by GCR and the outcome W
right after that step (since S is weakly cohesive, such i always exists). Since i ∈ S, we have
ui(W ) < β. We know that i was removed as a member of some weakly (β
′, T ′)-cohesive group.
We have that β′ > β (as GCR maximizes this value) and at the same time, since T ′ ⊆ W , we
have β′ 6 ui(T
′) 6 ui(W ) < β—a contradiction. Hence, such a group S does not exist.
4.2 Priceability and Exhaustiveness
GCR satisfies neither priceability (Definition 8) nor exhaustiveness (Definition 9). However, we
will prove that an outcome elected by this rule can be always completed to a priceable one; this
suggests that GCR never elects outcomes that are “too unbalanced”. In the proof of Theorem 5
we describe precisely how such a completion can be implemented. Using a somewhat different
completion scheme, we can complete GCR to an exhaustive outcome (using the exhaustive variant
of Rule X). This way we obtain an outcome that is both exhaustive and also close to being
priceable.
We start by proving three useful lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Polyandrious generalization of Hall’s marriage theorem). Let G = (U + V,E) be a
bipartite graph and for every A ⊆ U denote by NG(A) the neighbourhood of A, i.e. NG(A) = {v ∈
V : ∃u ∈ A.{u, v} ∈ E}. Let q ∈ N. Then for each A ⊆ U we have that |NG(A)| > |A| · q if and
only if there exists a one-to-q mapping from each vertex in U to some q vertices in V , such that
to each vertex from V at most one vertex from U is mapped.
Proof. Consider the graph G′ obtained by replacing set U with its q copies: U1, . . . , Uq (we also
copy edges). Consider now any set A ∈
⋃
i Ui. As
⋃
i Ui consists of q separate copies, there
exists i ∈ [q] such that |A ∩ Ui| > |A|/q. Hence, from our assumption we have that |NG(A)| >
|NG(A∩Ui)| > q|A∩Ui| > |A|. Now, from Hall’s marriage theorem, in G
′ there exists a matching
between
⋃
i Ui and V , covering set
⋃
i Ui. Hence, in graph G it is enough to map each vertex
u ∈ U to these q vertices in V , to which q copies of u are matched in G′. Naturally, the implication
holds also in the reverse direction—if there exists a one-to-q mapping in G as described above,
then trivially for all A ⊆ U we have that |NG(A)| > q|A|.
Lemma 2. Let S be an (β, T )-cohesive group considered in some step of GCR. For every subset
A ⊆ T , the size of the set of voters S′ := {i ∈ S : ui(A) > 0} is at least cost(A) · n.
Proof. The statement is trivial for cost(A) = 0, so assume that cost(A) > 0. Suppose for the
sake of contradiction that the set S′ ⊆ S defined above has smaller size than cost(A) · n. Then
group S \ S′ together with set T \A is (β, T \ A)-cohesive. Indeed,
|S \ S′| > |S| − cost(A) · n > cost(T ) · n− cost(A) · n = cost(T \ A) · n.
Thus, as cost(A) > 0, S′ should be considered by GCR instead of group S, a contradiction.
Lemma 3. For every outcome of the GCR rule, there always exists a payment function satisfying
conditions (C1)–(C4) with b = 1.
Proof. Consider a single step of GCR and let S be an (β, T )-cohesive group considered in that
step. We will prove that there exists a price system in which voters from S pay cost(c) dollars
for each candidate c ∈ T .
Denote by d the least common multiple of the denominators of the rational numbers from the
set: {cost(c) : c ∈ T}. Note that 1/d is a divisor of all these costs. Assume that each candidate
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c is splitted into cost(c) · d parts, each one associated with cost 1/d. Besides, assume that each
voter has d coins, each one worth 1/d·n dollars.
Consider the bipartite graph G = (AT + AS , E), where AS is the set of all voters’ coins and
AT is the set of all candidates’ parts. In G there is an edge between a coin of a voter i ∈ S and
a part of a candidate c ∈ T if and only if ui(c) > 0.
Now, consider a set A ⊆ AT , and let us assess the size of the neighbourhood NG(A). Let C(A)
denote the set of candidates whose some parts belongs to A. There is an edge from p ∈ A to a
coin of a voter i only if i assigns a positive utility to the candidate of p. Thus, NG(A) consists of
coins of those voters, who assign a positive utility to some candidate from C(A). By Lemma 2
there are at least cost(C(A)) · n such voters, each voter comes with d coins, thus:
|NG(A)| > cost(C(A)) · n · d > cost(A) · n · d.
Further, since each part of A costs exactly 1/d, we get that:
|NG(A)| > cost(A) · n · d = 1/d · |A| · n · d = |A| · n.
Hence, from Lemma 1 we have that there exists a mapping from AT to AS such that every part
of every candidate c is mapped to n coins and to each coin at most one candidate is mapped.
Now the payment function is constructed as follows: for every voter i ∈ S and candidate c ∈ T ,
if exactly q coins of i are mapped with some parts of c, then pi(c) = q/d·n. It is straightforward
to check that such a payment function satisfies conditions (C1)–(C4) for b = 1, which completes
the proof.
Finally, we can state the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 5. Every outcome W elected by GCR can be completed to some priceable outcome.
Proof. From Lemma 3, we know that there exists a family of payment functions {p}i∈N satisfying
conditions (C1)–(C4) for W . Now, to obtain outcome W ′ supported by a valid price system, it is
enough to run Rule X for this instance with initial outcome set to W and the initial endowment
of every voter i ∈ N set to 1/n−
∑
c∈W pi(c).
4.3 Some Drawbacks of the Greedy Cohesive Rule
Since GCR satisfies FJR but Rule X does not, we may conclude that GCR is a better rule. Clearly,
GCR is custom-engineered to satisfy FJR. Thus, we may expect the rule to be deficient in other
dimensions. The results in Section 4.2 certainly suggest that GCR is not pathological, but in this
section we consider some examples where Rule X seems to select better outcomes than GCR.
We begin by discussing a property that Peters and Skowron [2020] call laminar proportionality .
This property identifies a family of well-behaved preference profiles and specifies the outcome on
those profiles. The axiom is defined for the case of approval-based committee elections. Rule X
satisfies; the following example shows that GCR does not.
Example 6 (GCR fails laminar proportionality). Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and k = 8, and introduce
the candidate sets X = {c1, . . . , c4}, Y = {c5, . . . , c10}, and Z = {c11, c12}. The first three voters
approve X ∪Y , and the fourth one approves X ∪Z. Two copies of the profile are depicted below.
The candidates are represented by boxes; each candidate is approved by the voters who are below
the corresponding box.
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v1 v2 v3 v4
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
v1 v2 v3 v4
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
In this election instance, laminar proportionality would require that the voting rule selects all
the candidates from X since they are approved by everyone. After electing the candidates in X,
four seats are left to fill. Since the group {v1, v2, v3} the three times as large as the group {v4},
laminar proportionality requires that we elect three candidates from Y and one candidate from Z.
Thus, the committee indicated by the green boxes on the left-hand figure is laminar proportional.
On the other hand, in the first step GCR can choose the weakly (6, Y )-cohesive group {v1, v2, v3}
and in the second step it can select the weakly (2, Z)-cohesive group {v4}. This results in the blue
committee depicted in the right-hand figure; this committee fails laminar proportionality.
Example 6 shows that in general, GCR is not laminar proportional, as it can return committees
which are prohibited by the axiom. However, this example is not fully satisfactory, as it depends
on tie-breaking. For example, in the first step we could choose the weakly (6, {c2, c3, c4, c5, c6})-
cohesive group containing the first three voters, and in the second step the weakly (2, {c1, c11})-
cohesive group containing the last voter. An open question is whether GCR can always elect a
committee satisfying laminar proportionality (among others). However, the following example
shows that for some ’nearly laminar’ instances, GCR does not match the general intuition standing
behind this axiom.
Example 7. Modify the instance described in Example 6 in the following way: we have N =
[4000]. Voter 1 approves only candidates from Y , voters 2 to 3000 approve X ∪Y , voters 3001 to
3999 approve X ∪ Z and voter 4000 approves Z.
v1 v2 − v3000 v3001 − v3999 v4000
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
c6
c7
c8
c9
c10
c11
c12
This instance is not laminar (because of the two voters not approving X), but it is close to being
laminar and it is reasonable to expect that the elected committee should be the same as the
green one from Example 6. Rule X uniquely elects that committee. On the other hand, GCR
selects first the weakly (6, Y )-cohesive group containing the first 3000 voters and in the second
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step the weakly (2, Z)-cohesive group containing the last 1000 voters. After that the algorithm
stops, electing committee Y ∪ Z, as depicted above. Note that in this case, the choice of weakly
cohesive groups is unique.
Examples 6 and 7 do not rule out the existence of an FJR rule that is also laminar proportional;
the existence of a natural example of such a rule is an interesting open problem.
5 Rule X and GCR for Ordinal Ballots
In this section we discuss how our two rules can be adapted for committee elections where voters
have ordinal preferences, that is, voters express their preferences by ranking the candidates. The
main idea is straightforward: we convert voters’ preference rankings into additive valuations, by
using positional scoring rules, and then apply our rules to the resulting election. Note that if
we use scoring rules that assign positive values to positions in voters’ rankings, we always obtain
exhaustive rules. We will show that when we use a lexicographic conversion scheme in which voters
care infinitely more about their top-ranked candidate than their second-ranked candidate and so
on, then Rule X satisfies an axiom called Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC). which was
first introduced to analyze the Single Transferable Vote [Woodall, 1994, Tideman and Richardson,
2000]. (GCR does not satisfy PSC.) Rule X as applied to ordinal preferences is related to the
Expanding Approvals rule of Aziz and Lee [2020]. Interestingly, due to its flexibility, Rule X can
be used to extend the proportionality idea behind PSC beyond a lexicographic interpretation of
preferences: Depending on how we convert voters’ preference rankings to cardinal utilities, we
obtain different forms of proportionality (cf., Faliszewski et al., 2019). For example, if we use
Borda scores, we obtain a rule that chooses outcomes where the average position of selected
candidates in voters’ rankings is high.
5.1 Model for Ordinal Preferences
In this section we assume that each voter i ∈ N submits a strict preference order ≻i over the set of
candidates. The order ci1 ≻i ci2 ≻ . . . ≻ cim means that ci1 is voter’s i most preferred candidate,
ci2 is her second most-preferred candidate, and so on. By posi(c) we denote the position of
candidate c in i’s preference ranking. In the above example we have posi(ci1) = 1, posi(ci2) = 2,
and so on. For sets A and B, we write A ≻i B if a ≻i b for all a ∈ A, b
′ ∈ B.
Further, we assume unit costs, so that the goal is to select a committee of k candidates, and
thus that the cost of each candidate is 1/k.
Definition 12 (Proportionality for Solid Coalitions (PSC)). An outcome W satisfies PSC if for
each ℓ ∈ [k], each subset of voters S ⊆ N with S > nℓ/k, and each subset of candidates T such
that T ≻i C \ T for all i ∈ S, it holds that |W ∩ T | > min(ℓ, |T |).
A rule satisfies PSC if for each election it only returns outcomes that satisfy PSC.
5.2 Rule X and PSC
Definition 12 focuses on voters’ top preferences—intuitively, it requires that if c ≻i c
′, then the
utility that voter i assigns to candidate c is infinitely higher than that assigned to c′. Rule X
naturally extends to such preferences, which we call lexicographic utilities, but we need to adapt
Definition 1 to use a slightly different interpretation of the price per unit of utility, ρ. So far we
assumed that ρ is a positive real value; in order to adapt the definition to lexicographic preferences
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we assume that ρ ∈ [m], and that the multiplication by candidates’ utilities is defined as follows:
ρ · ui(c) =
{
1 if ρ > posi(c),
0 otherwise.
Proposition 4. Rule X for lexicographic utilities satisfies PSC.
Proof. Consider a committee W returned by Rule X for an election instance (N,C, k, {≻i}i∈N ).
Let ℓ ∈ [k], S ⊆ N , and T be as in Definition 12. The voters in S initially have the following
amount of money:
|S| · 1/n > nℓ/k · 1/n = ℓ/k.
Consider the steps of Rule X as the price per unit of utility, ρ, increases from 1 to |T |. In
each such step, each voter from S can pay only for the candidates in T . Indeed, each candidate
c ∈ C \ T occupies a worse position than |T | in those voters’ preference rankings, and so for each
i ∈ S we have ρ · ui(c) = 0 (since ρ 6 |T |). When ρ reaches |T |, then for each candidate c ∈ T
and each i ∈ S we have ui(c) = 1. The voters from S have enough money to buy ℓ candidates,
and so they will buy at least min(ℓ, |T |) candidates from T .
One may wonder, given the lexicographic utility scheme, whether PSC is just a consequence of
Rule X satisfying EJR. Example 8 below shows that this is not the case and that the two axioms
are logically incomparable in this context. FJR and PSC are also logically incomparable.
Example 8. Consider three voters with the following preference orders over C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}:
1 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4
2: c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c4
3: c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c4.
Assume k = 2. In this example PSC would require that two candidates from {c1, c2, c3} are
elected. On the other hand, committee {c1, c4} satisfies FJR.
Now, consider two voters with the following preferences:
1: c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c2
2: c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c1.
Assume k = 2. Here, EJR requires that c1 or c2 must be selected. On the other hand, {c3, c4} is
a committee that satisfies PSC.
5.3 GCR and PSC
GCR can also be adapted to lexicographic utilities. In this case, it is sufficient to assume that
the utilities are exponentially decreasing with the positions—for each i ∈ N and c ∈ C we set
ui(c) = m
−posi(c). Then, for each c we have that ui(c) >
∑
c′≺ic
ui(c
′), and so the utility a voter
assigns to a candidate in position p is higher than the utility that it would assign to any committee
all of whose members are ranked below p. Example 8 shows that FJR does not imply PSC, and
in fact GCR does not satisfy PSC.
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Example 9. Consider the following preference profile:
1: c1 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c6 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c9 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
2: c1 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c6 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c9 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
3: c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c6 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c9 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
4: c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c6 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c9 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
5: c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c6 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c9 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
6: c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c6 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c9 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
7: c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c9 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
8: c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c9 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
9: c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c9 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c6 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
10: c5 ≻ c4 ≻ c9 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c6 ≻ c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12
11: c10 ≻ c11 ≻ c12 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c9
12: c11 ≻ c10 ≻ c12 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c9.
Assume k = 4. Here, GCR will first pick S = {1, . . . , 6} as a weakly cohesive group, with
the corresponding set of candidates T = {c1, c6}. Indeed, if T consisted of 3 candidates, then S
would need to have at least 9 voters. However, any 9 voters rank at least 4 different candidates
at the top position, thus at least one of them would have a lower satisfaction than the voters
from S have from T . By the same argument, T cannot consist of 4 candidates. If T consisted of
2 candidates but S included one voter from 7, . . . , 12, then the satisfaction of voter 1 or 2 would
also be lower. Indeed, these two voters rank c2, c3, c4, c5, c10, and c11 (that is candidates that
appear in the top positions) below c6.
Hence, GCR picks c1 and c6, and removes the first 6 voters from further consideration. In the
second step, the rule picks c7 and c8. This is because each other candidate appears at most twice
before c7 and c8 in the remaining voters’ rankings. Thus, the rule picks c1, c6, c7 and c8.
On the other hand, by looking at voters 3, . . . , 8 we observe that PSC requires that two candi-
dates from c1, c2, c3 should be selected.
6 Conclusion
In this paper have formulated two axioms, EJR and FJR, that capture the idea of proportionality
in the participatory budgeting (PB) model. We have argued that none of the prominent com-
mittee election rules extend to the PB model so that it would satisfy even much weaker forms of
proportionality. We have designed a simple and natural rule for the PB model, Rule X. It satis-
fies EJR and other proportionality-related properties such as priceability, and it is computable in
polynomial time. The stronger of our two properties, FJR, is also satisfiable, albeit by a different
and arguably less natural voting rule. It is an interesting open question whether there exists a
natural voting rule that satisfies FJR and shares other desirable properties of Rule X.
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